Abstract
How do interest groups that advocate for the poor influence policy choices in Congress? In this article, I analyze collaborative lobbying by antipoverty advocates in an effort to explain how groups with small budgets and membership bases influence legislative policy choices. I theorize that advocates gain influence by collaborating with partners that possess different types of political resources. In a departure from existing scholarship, my theory views influence as deriving from a set of interest groups lobbying collaboratively rather than an interest group lobbying autonomously, and identifies diversity as the mechanism underlying a coalition’s influence. I provide empirical support for the theory through an analysis of the collaborative activities of antipoverty advocates in the two years preceding the 1996 welfare reform law. By shifting the analytic focus away from an individual group and towards a set of groups, the article helps explain lobbying and influence in an understudied but increasingly important policy domain, while drawing attention to the important role of coalitions and collaborative lobbying in the policymaking process.

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Can groups that advocate for the poor influence policy choices in the United States Congress? According to a large body of scholarship in political science, the answer is a resounding no. Interest groups that lobby on behalf of low-income populations are few in number, representing less than one percent of all Washington-based interest groups (Schlozman et al. 2012). Those that do exist lack the large budgets and membership bases that political scientists argue facilitate legislative influence (Berry and Arons 2003; Hays 2001; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Yet policy scholarship finds that advocates for the poor play an important role in both securing policy gains on behalf of the poor and protecting against policy cuts (Haskins 2006; Patterson 2000 [1981]; Trattner 1999 [1974]). This introduces a disconnect between political science research that predicts the absence of influence on behalf of the poor and policy scholarship that finds that advocates for the poor do at times achieve their policy goals.

The persistence of poverty and growth of income inequality has prompted scholars to devote greater attention to identifying the ways in which advocates for the poor are able to shape the policy choices of elected leaders. This article engages the topic of influence on behalf of the poor by focusing theoretical and empirical attention on interest group coalitions and collaborative lobbying in Congress. Building on insights from existing interest group scholarship, I theorize that advocates for the poor mitigate their resource deficiencies and enhance their influence by collaborating with partners possessing diverse organizational resources. Coalitions that unite actors with diverse resources draw a broad array of tools to a
lobbying effort, thereby expanding the range of lobbying activities in which advocates can engage and increasing the likelihood of policy influence.

The theory builds upon a burgeoning body of research that focuses analytic attention on interest group coalitions and their role in the policy process (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Heaney 2004; Hojnacki 1997; Hula 1999; Nelson and Yackee 2012). In contrast to much of the existing literature on interest group influence, such research conceives of influence as deriving from a set of groups lobbying collaboratively rather than an interest group lobbying autonomously. When the coalition is positioned as the entity capable of shaping legislative policy choices, it is the resources and lobbying activities of a set of actors that are hypothesized to lead to policy influence, rather than the resources of any individual group. This theoretical shift yields a new set of expectations regarding lobbying and influence and demands a new approach for studying lobbying and influence empirically. Specifically, a theoretical focus on coalitions requires an empirical strategy centered on formal and informal coalitions rather than individual interest groups.

To analyze the support for the theory and refine theoretical predictions for future empirical research, I examine the informal and formal coalitions that were active on behalf of the poor in the two years preceding the 1996 passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), or welfare reform. One of the most significant federal social policies of the last several decades, the PRWORA fundamentally transformed the landscape of public assistance to needy families. The breadth and significance of the policy activated many different types of organizations that were mobilized around diverse populations and interests, providing an opportunity to analyze the collaborative behavior of a large number of advocates across a range of issues of concern to the poor.
The empirical analysis demonstrates that during welfare reform, advocates for the poor collaborated frequently in their efforts to influence legislative policy choices, utilizing both preexisting formal coalitions and developing new ad-hoc partnerships. Coalitions varied tremendously in their form, with many consisting of loose partnerships between groups with common policy goals. While some coalitions drew together partners that were similar, other coalitions brought together groups that differed in terms of the resources that coalition partners possessed. Two types of diversity appeared salient to advocates’ lobbying activities. Specifically, coalitions that united organizations from different policy sectors and with different partisan contacts allowed advocates to expand their lobbying efforts by communicating broad support for their policy positions, mobilizing grassroots support from other policy sectors, and accessing Republican members of Congress.

The article makes several contributions to existing literature. First, the article contributes to a growing body of research that highlights the importance of interest group coalitions in the policymaking process. The article develops a theory to explain why and how diversity within coalitions matters in legislative policymaking and demonstrates support for the theory through an analysis of coalitional involvement during welfare reform. Second, the article contributes to scholars’ understanding of how advocates for the poor mitigate their resource limitations and gain influence in Congress. Because few studies focus on lobbying on social welfare issues, scholars know very little about the lobbying activities of advocates as they seek to influence policy choices. The absence of knowledge is problematic; if poverty and economic inequality continue to grow, such issues are likely to occupy central space on the national policymaking agenda in coming years.
Finally, while the article focuses on interest group advocacy in the social policy domain, the theory that diverse coalitions enhance policy influence likely has implications across policy domains. Institutional changes including the growth and decentralization of Congress have created incentives for all types of groups to collaborate in order to pool disparate resources and reach the many legislators involved on any given issue (Hula 1999; Loomis 1986). In addition, the finding that all types of groups collaborate and that policy battles engage a diverse array of participants suggests that groups across policy domains have numerous opportunities and incentives to work with partners that differ in some way (Baumgartner et al. 2009). Thus there are strong reasons to suspect that the application of the theory across issue areas may help scholars better understand the mechanisms and conditions of interest group influence in Congress.

In the following sections, I present the theory and empirical analysis. In the next section, I build from existing research on interest group lobbying and influence to develop a theory of coalitional influence in Congress. The third section describes my empirical approach, in which I analyze coalitional activity among advocates for the poor on one prominent federal social welfare policy. The fourth section outlines how I collect and analyze data on coalitional activity during welfare reform. In the fifth section, I present my empirical analysis, which illustrates support for the theory’s central premises and refines specific theoretical predictions for future empirical work. The final section discusses the key findings and implications of the analysis and concludes.
Diverse Resources and Coalitional Influence in Congress

Interest group scholars have generated an impressive body of literature on the mechanisms and conditions of interest group influence in Congress (see Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Hojnacki et al. 2012; Smith 1995 for reviews). While offering many valuable insights, much of this literature is characterized by a conception of organized interests as acting autonomously in pursuit of their policy goals. In this view, competition for legislators’ attention creates incentives for groups to develop unique identities and areas of competence in order to gain access to legislators, as well as build and solidify a membership base (Browne 1990; see Hojnacki 1997 for a review). Such incentives lead groups to lobby independently rather than in partnership.

When interest groups are viewed as autonomous actors, it is difficult to understand how groups that lobby on behalf of low-income populations exert influence in legislative settings. This is because groups that advocate for the poor, including membership-based advocacy groups, social service providers, public interest law firms, and social welfare research organizations, lack many of the resources that interest groups use to gain influence (Hays 2001). Relative to the corporate and professional interests that dominate Washington politics, advocates tend to have small budgets, limiting their ability to contribute to political campaigns, fund issue advertisements, or mobilize extensive lobbying campaigns (Imig 1996; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). In addition, because such groups either lack members or have small membership bases, advocates are limited in their ability to leverage constituency support to gain favorable treatment from legislators (Salisbury 1990; Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie 1993).

Yet advocates for the poor do not always lobby on their own, but rather work together in their efforts to shape policy choices (Heaney 2004; Strolovitch 2007). Strolovitch (2007, 185)
finds that over 96 percent of Washington-based interest groups mobilized around issues related to poverty and economic justice reported using coalitions as a strategy of political influence. Indeed, coalitions of groups working towards common policy goals are prevalent across policy domains (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki 1997; Hula 1999). Schlozman and Tierney (1986), for example, find that 90 percent of Washington interest groups report entering into coalitions to gain influence (Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 148-155).

Recognizing the prevalence of coalitions, interest group scholars have increasingly prioritized coalitions in their research. While much of the existing research on coalitions focuses on the determinants of collaboration (Loomis 1986; Salisbury 1990; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Hojnacki 1997; Holyoke 2004; Heaney and Lorenz 2013; Hula 1999; Mahoney 2007), a growing number of studies investigate the consequences of collaborative lobbying for policy outcomes (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Heaney and Lorenz 2013; Nelson and Yackee 2012). Such studies draw attention to the characteristics and resources of formal and informal partnerships, and how these characteristics and resources matter for gaining political influence. Nelson and Yackee (2012), for instance, demonstrate that consensus within coalitions is associated with increased policy influence in federal rulemaking, while Baumgartner and colleagues (2009) show that aggregate resource disparities between opposing “sides” of policy debates help to explain which side achieves policy success in the short term.

Research on coalitional influence builds upon the premise that interest groups collaborate, in part, to pool their resources (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki 1997; Mahoney 2007). The theory developed in this article similarly views coalitions as tools for pooling resources, but posits that the influence of a coalition derives not from the extent to which a coalition expands upon existing resources, but rather the extent to which a coalition diversifies
the resources that a set of organizations can mobilize. Thus it is the diversity of a coalition’s organizational members, rather than the overall number of coalition partners or the resources of any particular partner, that underlies a coalition’s effectiveness.

Diversity is defined as heterogeneity in the material and informational resources that organizations use to influence legislators. Material resources include financial resources, overall staff size and number of employed lobbyists, as well as contacts within government (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Informational resources include information about constituents’ policy preferences, technical expertise about policy, and political information about the alignment of support and opposition for a policy across interested actors (Esterling 2004, Krehbiel 1992, Wright ([1995] 2003).

I theorize that formal and informal coalitions that mobilize different types of resources are influential because they provide groups with a broad range of tools to use in their collective lobbying efforts, while allowing groups to access multiple legislators accountable to different regional, professional, and partisan interests. Drawing different types of resources to a lobbying effort is important because legislators’ policy choices are shaped by a wide range of factors, not all of which are addressed by the campaign contributions or informational resources of a single organized interest (Kingdon 1989). For example, an extensive lobbying campaign by a resource-rich corporate actor may fail to persuade legislators concerned with constituents’ reactions to the proposed policy. Even in the presence of constituent support for policy change, legislators may be unwilling to enact the policy in the absence of technical information about how the policy is intended to work or its likelihood of success. Perhaps for this reason, previous research yields conflicting findings regarding the relationship between individual group resources and policy success, with some studies finding strong evidence that resources are associated with enhanced
influence and other studies finding minimal evidence of influence (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Smith 1999)

Diverse coalitions also allow groups to target legislators responsive to different types of interests. Because authority over policy decisions is distributed across chambers and committees, many members of Congress are involved at multiple stages of the policymaking process (Deering and Smith 1997). As a result, interest groups seeking to shape the content or fate of legislation must target numerous legislators in their lobbying efforts. A set of organizations working collaboratively can deliver more lobbyists, devote more hours to lobbying, and capitalize on a greater number of government contacts, relative to an organization lobbying alone (Hula 1999). Yet because legislators are accountable to different constituents and interests, coalitions consisting of partners representing different interests are better able to reach the many legislators involved on any given policy decision. Moreover, in a highly partisan environment, proponents of policy change may need to persuade legislators representing different parties and ideologies.

Policy debates, both within the social policy domain and across policy domains, typically engage a wide range of actors possessing a diverse array of resources. In their analysis of 98 issues in Washington, Baumgartner and colleagues (2009) note that nearly all policies are multidimensional and engage a varied mix of participants. Despite the inherent complexity of each issue, organized interests typically find themselves on one of two sides of a policy debate – opposing or supporting the status quo policy (20-22). Each side collectively possesses a heterogeneous array of resources (210-212). This suggests that groups possessing different types of resources frequently find themselves with similar interests in a policy debate and strong incentives to collaborate.
Diverse coalitions are likely to represent a particularly important tool for advocates for low-income populations, given that such groups lack the large budgets and membership bases that are theorized to facilitate interest group influence. By collaborating with diverse partners, advocates can leverage the material resources and constituent support of partners in their efforts to influence policy choices. Like other issues, social welfare policies are multidimensional, involving different committees and subcommittees as well as a range of interested actors. Advocates for the poor must therefore reach multiple legislators responsive to different types of interests, particularly when policy debates involve more than one program or are broad in scope.

The theory implies that advocates for the poor will build coalitions with partners possessing different types of political resources and that diverse coalitions will enhance advocates’ influence over the legislative policymaking process. In the following sections, I analyze the collaborative activity of anti-poverty advocates in the two years preceding the passage of welfare reform in order to examine the empirical support for the theory. The analysis is oriented towards assessing the general support for the theory and refining theoretical predictions rather than assessing the causal impact of diverse coalitions. To this end, the analysis focuses on the following questions: Did advocates collaborate with diverse partners as a strategy of legislative influence? If so, along what dimensions were coalitions diverse? Did diverse partnerships expand the scope or the nature of advocates’ lobbying activities? If so, how?

**Empirical Approach**

My empirical analysis focuses on the informal and formal coalitions that lobbied on behalf of low-income populations in the two years preceding the passage of one prominent federal social welfare policy. I investigate collaborative lobbying on a single policy for two
reasons. First, the analysis presented in this article aims to build theory regarding a poorly understood strategy of influence, rather than subject a set of fully developed hypotheses to empirical testing (Gerring 2004). An analysis of a single case is well-suited for this approach because such an analysis permits the researcher to delve deeply into the data and simultaneously consider multiple hypotheses about a given phenomenon. By analyzing a single case, I am able to assess the support for the theory’s general predictions about collaborative lobbying and diversity within coalitions while using the data to help refine specific predictions for future empirical research.

Second, analyzing a single policy allows me to observe and analyze coalitions of varying degrees of formality. In other words, I am able to observe coalitions that operate as distinct organizational entities as well as coalitions that remain informal in nature. This is important because there are theoretical reasons to suspect that coalitions allow groups to pool diverse resources and can lead to influence regardless of their level of formality. The need to investigate a variety of sources in order to identify informal coalitions leads me to probe deeply into a single case, rather than adopt a strategy that sacrifices depth in the interest of generalizing across cases.

With a single case design, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), or welfare reform, represents an ideal case to analyze. The reform proposals offered by Congressional Republicans in early 1994 were broad in scope and represented a significant departure from the status quo. A large number of antipoverty advocates considered the proposals to be salient to their interests, as did a range of other actors that found their interests either challenged or supported by welfare reform proposals. The fact that welfare reform activated a large and diverse set of interests provides both an opportunity to examine whether advocates collaborated with diverse partners as a strategy of influence and to
examine the dimensions along which coalitions were diverse. In addition, the considerable popular and scholarly interest in welfare reform creates a wealth of data upon which to draw when analyzing the lobbying activities of advocates on this issue.

Second, although welfare reform is widely regarded as an overall “loss” for advocates for the poor, advocates’ success actually varied across issues within welfare reform. For example, while the PRWORA ultimately ended the individual entitlement to cash assistance, “maintenance-of-effort” provisions were instituted to ensure that states maintained a minimum level of spending on the welfare program. Food and nutrition programs and child welfare program were not transformed from entitlement into block grant programs, despite initial proposals to do so (Weaver 2000). In addition, issues within welfare reform varied with respect to the conflict and salience to interested participants. Analyzing welfare reform therefore offers the opportunity to explore collaborative lobbying across issues that created different incentives for groups to collaborate and on which advocates had varying degrees of success.

Yet it is also true that welfare reform represents an atypical case. Indeed, the breadth and significance of PRWORA makes it likely to witness collaboration between groups representing different types of interests. The case selection was intended to maximize the amount of information that could be gained about advocates’ collaborative activities, rather than serve as a “representative” case of lobbying in the social policy domain. Atypical cases are often able to provide a greater number of insights about a given phenomenon because they involve more actors and mechanisms of interest (Flyvbjerg 2013). In this instance, the fact that welfare reform created strong incentives for groups to collaborate allowed me to examine a wide range of coalitions as well as multiple types of diversity within coalitions, and analyze whether and how such diversity expanded advocates’ lobbying activities. Because welfare reform is an unusual
case, the analysis is not meant to imply that advocates pursue diverse collaboration across all issues. Rather, the analysis is meant to examine whether and how diverse coalitions help advocates enhance their influence in the policymaking process in order to generate insights that can be used in future theoretical and empirical work.

Given the focus on a single case, it is important to clarify what the analysis can and cannot show. The analysis allows me to examine whether advocates collaborated with diverse partners as a strategy of legislative influence, the form that their coalitions took, and the axes of coalitional diversity that appeared salient for their lobbying efforts. More broadly, the analysis allows me to assess whether a focus on coalitions can help scholars better understand how groups attempt to gain influence in the social policymaking process. At this stage of development, the analysis is not designed to test the hypothesis that coalitional diversity leads to legislative influence. Before moving to tests of causal impact, it is necessary to defend the analytic focus on coalitions and refine theoretical expectations regarding the types of diversity that are likely to matter for legislative influence. Such insights can be then used in future empirical work examining the independent impact of diverse coalitions on legislative policy choices.

Data and Methods

As discussed above, a theoretical focus on coalitions requires a data collection strategy focused on sets of organizations rather than individual groups. To identify the informal and formal coalitions that were active during welfare reform, I employ a range of primary and secondary source material. I examine hearings testimony from 12 hearings held by the Subcommittee on Human Resources in the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee between January and April of 1995. The hearings data consist of over 2,000 thousands of pages of oral testimony, submitted statements, and question and answer sessions, and cover multiple program areas. The hearings testimony allow me to both identify the types of organized interests active on welfare reform and observe coalitions that engaged in “inside lobbying” tactics, or tactics that involved direct contact or communication with legislators.

I also examine news articles to identify coalitions that prioritized “outside lobbying” tactics, or tactics designed to exert pressure on legislators indirectly by mobilizing constituents or acting through the media. To generate the set of articles, I search all articles in the New York Times published between November 8, 1994, the date of the Congressional midterm elections, and August 22, 1996, the date that President Clinton signed the PRWORA, using the search terms “welfare” and (“Aid to Families with Dependent Children” or “AFDC”). This search generates a list of 747 articles, of which I keep only those articles listing one or more organizational actors by name.

I supplement the hearings and newspaper data with reports from a variety of sources, including archival documents from Clinton Presidential Library, organizational records, and select secondary sources. When the initial data provided evidence of collaborative activity, I probe additional journalistic and scholarly sources to provide greater coverage of the coalition. I make extensive use of archival documents from the Clinton Presidential Library, which contains a welfare reform collection of nearly 70 boxes documenting the activities of the administration, Congress, and outside actors on the issue. I also examine the organizational archives of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund to provide information on behind-the-scenes activities of one prominent ad-hoc coalition. Finally, welfare reform generated significant scholarly interest, and
when appropriate, I integrate existing scholarly work to provide greater context of activities of organized interests during welfare reform. Using these sources, I am able to identify a set of informal and formal coalitions active on the issue of welfare reform between November 1994 and August 1996. For each coalition, I analyze differences across coalition partners along several dimensions. For instance, I examine whether partners represent distinct professions or public interests, the extent to which allies were mobilized around different types of policies (health policies or child welfare policies, for example), and differences in organizational structure and partisan affiliation across coalition partners. I analyze how the resources of groups differ given their focus, policy domain, structure, and partisan attachments, and whether there is evidence that advocates used the diverse resources of coalition partners strategically in their efforts to shape policy choices. Through this analysis, I am able to assess whether support exists for the general expectations of the theory and illustrate how different types of diversity allowed advocate to expand their lobbying activities.

**Empirical Analysis**

*Interest Group Involvement in Welfare Reform*

For sixty years prior to the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1996 (PRWORA), cash welfare benefits were provided to low-income families through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Welfare reform emerged on the national political agenda in the early 1990s, after both Democratic and Republican candidates made reforming the unpopular welfare program a campaign issue. Democratic candidate Bill Clinton pledged to “end welfare as we know it” in his 1992 presidential campaign while Republican congressional candidates vowed to transform the AFDC
program as part of their “Contract with America,” a set of ten policies that candidates promised to enact if elected (Contract with America 1994).

When the Republican Party assumed majority control of Congress following the midterm elections of 1994, Republican members of Congress seized on the welfare reform issue and introduced legislation to reform the safety net within the first few days of the 104th Congress (1995-1996) (Haskins 2006). The Republican proposal represented a fundamental transformation of the public assistance system, converting an array of entitlement programs (including AFDC, food and nutrition assistance programs, child disability programs, and child welfare programs) into block grants in which grants to states would be capped to avoid spending increases. Welfare recipients who had been receiving benefits for two years would be required to work in order to continue participating in the program. In addition, the legislation denied the payment of benefits to children born to mothers currently receiving AFDC and prohibited states from paying cash benefits to children born to unmarried mothers under the age of 18 and for whom paternity had not been established (US House 1995b).

The breadth and significance of the proposed changes activated a large number of groups representing multiple populations and policy sectors and with varying ideological and partisan affiliations. The range of interests involved is evident in the first set of Congressional hearings on welfare reform. Over the course of 13 days in early 1995, 169 groups and individuals either testified in person or submitted testimony before House and Senate committee and subcommittee hearings on welfare reform. Table 1 illustrates the distribution of organizations that participated in these early welfare reform hearings (column 1), as well as the frequency of similar types of groups in two other national studies (columns 2 and 3).
Table 1 shows that of the 169 organizations and actors, 33 percent are citizen groups, a category that includes membership and non-membership organizations that represent non-vocational interests. Just over one-third of the citizen groups (12 percent of all organized interests) are mobilized specifically around social welfare issues such as poverty or hunger. This category includes organizations of poor people, such as the Welfare Rights Organizing Coalition, as well as organizations that advocate on behalf of poor people or poverty-related issues, such as the Coalition on Human Needs. The remaining citizen groups (21 percent of all organized interest) are mobilized around other issues or populations including women, children and families, traditional values, and the disabled.

Seventeen percent of those that testified are service providers such as the United Way of America (14 percent of all organized actors) or law firms that provide legal services to the poor, such as the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago (4 percent of all organized actors). Approximately 21 percent of organized interests are intergovernmental actors. This category includes groups such as the National League of Cities and the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services, as well as organizations of public employees, such as the National Governors’ Association. Research organizations like the Heritage Foundation and the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, alongside individual experts, represent approximately 16 percent of those that testified or submitted testimony.
Table 1. Organizational Involvement in Welfare Reform Hearings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Schlozman et al. (2012)</th>
<th>Baumgartner et al. (2009)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare Focus</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Focus</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare Service Provider</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Interest Law Firm</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental Group or Individual</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Group or Individual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Organization</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Expert</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Organization</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation, Business or Trade Association</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Organization</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: List of organizations drawn from witness lists from welfare reform hearings held in the House Ways and Means Committee Subcommittee on Human Resources and the Senate Finance Committee between January and April of 1995.

Notes: For Schlozman et al. (2012), category of citizen group (other) includes public interest and identity groups and citizen group (social welfare focus) includes both citizen groups and institutions that represent social welfare interest or poor populations. Categories in columns 2 and 3 do not sum to 100% because categories are excluded if there is no comparable category in column 1.
Relatively few organizations testified on behalf of private professional interests, business or trade associations, unions or religious organizations. The business and professional interests active during welfare reform include professional interests and trade associations engaged in the delivery of services to children and disabled populations, such as the American Academy of Pediatrics; organizations involved in the child support enforcement and collection such as the Child Support Council; and general business interests such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

The second and third columns illustrate that the distribution of groups active during welfare reform differ from the distribution of groups in the interest group community as a whole. Column 2 displays frequencies based on a list of organizations active in Washington (Schlozman et al. 2012) and column 3 displays frequencies based on a list of “major participants” across a sample of 98 policy issues (Baumgartner et al. 2009). While citizen groups and social welfare service providers represent over 25 percent of groups testifying on welfare, they collectively represent less than one percent of all groups in Washington (column 2). In addition, while few corporate and business interests testified during welfare reform, such groups comprise a strong majority of groups and major participants across other issues.

In part, the absence of professional, corporate, and business interests during welfare reform reflects the fact that social welfare policy issues are of limited relevance to many of the groups that dominate Washington politics. Antipoverty programs are typically proposed and supported by advocates for low-income populations, administered by governmental or charitable actors, and analyzed by research organizations with social policy expertise. Yet the absence of professional and business interests also reflects the fact that the Republican welfare reform bill aligned with the interests of conservative business and professional groups. While there is evidence that such groups monitored welfare reform hearings, they likely did not need to testify
because the legislation already reflected their interests and was unlikely to change dramatically (Winston 2002).

The categories presented in Table 1, which organize interest groups by their professional or public interest, are relevant for the types of resources that groups bring to their lobbying efforts. For example, intergovernmental actors and social welfare service providers possess information about the administration of welfare policy, while research organizations offer substantive information related to the efficacy of welfare programs. Citizen groups offer electoral information about constituent support for various policies and issues. Business, professional, and trade association have, on average, more material resources than citizen groups or social welfare organizations (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).

Yet such categories obscure other distinctions that matter for the resources groups bring to their lobbying effort. For instance, with the categories of “citizen group,” “service provider,” and “research group,” there are groups involved primarily with the social welfare policy domain, groups involved with programs related to health, disability, and education, and groups representing women’s interests or racial and ethnic minorities. Such differences stem not from whether a group represents a professional or public interest, but rather from the specific interest represented or the policy sector of which a group is a part. This difference is relevant because members of different policy communities have access to different networks of organizational actors and constituents – interests that they may be able to mobilize during a lobbying effort.

The categories shown in Figure 1 also conceal variation with respect to ideological and partisan orientation. While some organizations active during welfare reform maintained a nonpartisan stance, many were aligned with either Republican or Democratic interests. Most social welfare citizen groups and service providers lobbied for enhanced supports for welfare
recipients and were aligned with Democrats. Yet there were also advocates for conservative interests: nine of the 35 citizen groups in Table 1 are “traditional values” groups that lobbied for restrictive changes to the welfare program or for enhanced “fathers’ rights” (see Winston 2002). These groups were aligned with Republicans. There is also ideological variation among research organizations, intergovernmental groups, and service providers, with some groups, like the Heritage Foundation, affiliating with Republicans and others, like the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, working primarily with the Democrats.

Thus the organizations that were active during welfare reform represent an array of public and professional interests, yet also represent different policy interests and maintain different partisan or ideological affiliations. Such differences are associated with distinctions in the resources that groups brought to the policy debate. Each of these differences therefore represents a potential type of diversity within a coalition. For instance, a diverse coalition might unite groups representing both public and professional interests, or might draw together groups from different policy sectors. Did such coalitions emerge? And which (if any) dimensions of diversity were relevant for expanding advocates’ reach in the policymaking process?

*Formal and Informal Coalitions among Advocates for the Poor*

The data reveal that in the two years preceding PRWORA’s passage, advocates collaborated frequently in their lobbying efforts. Many coalitions were formal in nature: of the 169 organizations that testified or submitted testimony during Congressional hearing, 27 were formal coalitions (16 percent of all organizations), defined as an organization or named partnership in which members consisted of different organizations. A majority of formal coalitions represented long-standing partnerships. For instance, the Coalition on Human Needs, a
coalition mobilized around issues of concern to low-income populations, was established in 1981, and the Child Welfare League of America, a coalition of public and private child welfare service agencies, was founded in 1920 (Child Welfare League of America 2012; Coalition on Human Needs 2010). A small number of formal coalitions represented newly formed partnerships organized to either support or oppose specific provisions of welfare reform.

The presence of formal coalitions, however, understates the true degree of collaboration among advocates, as many partnerships did not develop into distinct organizational entities but rather remained informal in nature. Informal coalitions are evident in a variety of ways in the data, including through cosigned statements, coauthored letters, and joint press conferences. For example, during House subcommittee hearings, the United Way of America submitted a written statement entitled “The Role of Charities on Welfare Reform” and included with the statement a list of cosignatories, which included 11 national service organizations such as the Girl Scouts of America and Family Services of America, as well as over 150 state and local United Ways (US House 1995, 1027). This list of cosignatories provides evidence of an informal policy coalition consisting of different charitable service providers with similar preferences over policy choices.

Moving beyond Congressional hearings testimony, joint statements and letters to members of Congress also provide evidence of informal policy coalitions. A March 1995 letter to members of the House of Representatives, for example, provides evidence of an informal coalition that united three groups opposed to specific provisions of the House welfare legislation. In this letter, the President of Catholic Charities expressed dismay that the House Rules Committee had failed to rule several welfare amendments in order. The President stated: “The United States Catholic Bishops’ Conference, Catholic Charities USA and the National Right to Life Committee all agree that, with these amendments, [the welfare reform legislation] is likely
to increase abortions among teenagers and mothers on welfare.” In this letter, the President of Catholic Charities identifies a set of organizations that support allowing House members to vote on several amendments – a statement the President is unlikely to have made without first consulting the other organizations.

Many different informal partnerships are evident in the data, uniting groups of religious organizations, women’s organizations, child service agencies, as well as single-issue coalitions. As the examples suggest, coalitions often united groups that were similar with respect to their professional identity, interest or economic sector represented, or ideological orientation. The list of cosignatories to the United Way’s testimony, for instance, provides evidence of collaboration across charitable service providers. Such coalitions did not necessarily expand the resources available to coalition partners. All of the charitable service providers, for instance, lacked members, possessed comparable expertise about the implementation of social programs, and faced similar legal constraints on their lobbying activities (Berry and Arons 2005). Thus all cosignatories to the United Way’s testimony brought similar resources to their lobbying efforts.

The fact that many instances of collaboration occurred between similar groups is consistent with existing research that finds that coalitions most often form between groups that are similar with respect to their area of interest or orientation towards policy (Hula 1999). Yet formal and informal coalitions also developed between groups that differed along one or more dimensions. Two dimensions of diversity appeared particularly important to advocates’ lobbying efforts: diversity with respect to interest or policy sector and diversity with respect to partisan contacts. In the following sections, I describe coalitions that differed along these dimensions and discuss how such coalitions allowed advocates to extend their reach over the policymaking process by leveraging the differential resources of coalition partners.
Diverse Interests and Policy Sectors

The first type of diverse coalition united organizations representing different interests or policy sectors. This means that groups represented distinct groups of individuals – religious leaders or children’s health professionals, for example – or were primarily concerned with policies that were developed and administered by different sets of actors – education policies or social welfare policies, for instance. This type of diversity allowed advocates to use varied arguments to defend their policy positions and utilize the electoral resources of groups with large membership bases in their collaborative lobbying efforts.

The Coalition on Human Needs (CHN) provides one example of a formal coalition that united partners that differed with respect to their primary interest or policy sector. Formed in the early 1980s in response to the President Reagan’s proposed cuts to social welfare spending, the CHN is a partnership of more than 100 organizations concerned with issues involving low-income Americans. During welfare reform, the CHN was active in lobbying both publicly and behind the scenes, forming a Welfare Reform Task Force in 1992 in response to President Clinton’s early proposals to reform the welfare program (Weaver 2000). While partners were united in their interest in low-income Americans, they differed with respect to their primary policy area: members included mainstream religious organizations, public sector unions, civil rights organizations, women’s groups, and professional organizations. vii

An October 1995 news conference organized by the CHN illustrates how this type of diversity broadened the range of arguments that advocates could use in their lobbying efforts. During the conference, coalition partners used their varying forms of expertise to offer different arguments against Congressional welfare reform bills. Children’s Defense Fund President
Marian Wright Edelman declared Congressional welfare reform bills “morally wrong,” “unjust,” and “un-American.” The President of Bread for the World, a Christian anti-hunger organization, offered technical policy information about the inability of charitable organizations to care for the poor under Congressional welfare reform proposals. The Chair of the Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, an organization mobilized around issues of concern to the disabled, discussed the damaging effects of the House and Senate welfare reform bills for disabled children, and the representative for the National Organization for Women argued that women, regardless of their economic position, would notice and punish (electorally) those supporting the Congressional welfare reform bills (FDCH Political Transcripts, 5 October 1995).

Thus it was not simply that the House and Senate bills were unethical, but they also placed an unrealistic burden on charities, would have damaging impacts for disabled children, and would lead to negative electoral consequences for legislators. In other words, the informal coalition used different information from each member organization to provide a diverse set of arguments against Republican-led welfare reform efforts. Such arguments would not have been available – or at the very least, would have been less credible – had they been offered by any individual partner lobbying on its own.

Many of the coalitions that united partners representing different interests or policy sectors were spearheaded by advocates for poor children. These diverse coalitions allowed advocates to draw upon the electoral resources of partners in their lobbying efforts. Figure 2, which shows an advertisement run by advocates in the New York Times in 1995, provides an example of this type of coalition. Titled “The Contract with America: How much will all this cost our kids,” the advertisement describes the potential impact of changes included in the
Republican’s Contract with America, focusing on structural changes to child welfare, child care, cash welfare, and food and nutrition programs.

Displayed prominently on the right side of the advertisement is a list of organizations that support the advertisement. This list includes social welfare organizations like the Child Welfare League of America (CWLA) and the Food Research and Action Center (FRAC), as well as education organizations like the National Education Association (New York Times, 1995a). These organizations represented overlapping but certainly not identical interests. Of particular note in this informal coalition is the inclusion of the National Education Association, a membership-based organization of educational professionals including teachers, administrators, and students.
Figure 2. New York Times Advertisement, April 27, 1995

"The Contract With America"

HOW MUCH WILL ALL THIS COST OUR KIDS?

The "Contract With America" would change the lives of every child in every family in America. It could make our children's health care more affordable, our schools more effective, and our communities safer.

By cutting the lines of children today, the "Contract With America" will free the resources of our nation for the next fifty years.

Yet law professors, even the fresh-faced members of Congress rushing to vote on its complex provisions, have examined how much the "Contract" will cost our children—over the next five years and in the century to come.

What Does A Detailed Review Of The "Contract" Reveal?

- Funds for drug education in our schools will be cut. So will student aid and college loans. Funds to upgrade schools and train teachers will also drop.

No longer will share be any national promise that your child will have a chance to learn.
- Neglected and brainwashed children will not be protected as they are now.
- Three million children will be ignored.

The Urgent Need To Improve Child Support Collections

The contract with America's children is not being honored. The current system for collecting child support is not only not collecting enough, but it is also not enforcing the law. Congress should pass stronger enforcement measures to ensure that parents are held accountable for their responsibilities.

The "Contract" would not only strengthen the law but also provide incentives to the states to enforce it.

The Excitement Of New York's Kids

The "Contract" would provide new opportunities for our children's education. It would increase funding for schools and colleges, making higher education more accessible to all Americans.

The "Contract" would also establish a national initiative to address the needs of children in poverty and underprivileged communities.

Congress aims to redesign American society in six months or less. One mistake and millions of children will pay for the rest of their lives. That's why the following organizations ask you to join them in telling Congress to slow down for the sake of our children.

National Education Association
Guidelines for America's Children
Children's Defense Fund
National Association of Children's Defense Fund
Children's Defense Fund
Crain's Young Americans
Children's Defense Fund
National Black Child Development Institute
Child Advocates
Child Advocates

TELL CONGRESS TO SLOW DOWN
The “Contract with America’s Children,” developed by the Coalition for America’s Children and Children Now, provides another example of collaboration across groups representing distinct interests and policy sectors. The Contract – a play on the Republican’s “Contract with America” – was a statement of ten principles that members of Congress were asked to honor when legislating on issues such as welfare reform (Children Now 1994). On December 15, 1994, Children Now, the National Parent Teacher Association, and the Child Welfare League of America held a joint press conference on the Capitol steps to publicize the Contract, which was endorsed by over 100 members of the Coalition for America’s Children and distributed to all Congressional offices (Contact with America’s Children 1994; Stepp 1995). In this instance, children’s organizations were joined by social welfare organizations like the Child Welfare League of America and mainstream educational organizations like the National Parent Teacher Association (NPTA), thereby uniting the expertise of child advocates with the membership base of the NPTA.

The Stand for Children March is perhaps the most prominent example of collaboration across groups representing different interests and sectors. The March was organized by the Children’s Defense Fund, a prominent child advocacy group, and designed to focus public attention on the needs of America’s children. Held on June 1, 1996 in Washington DC, the event was attended by over 200,000 people and endorsed by over 3,000 organizations, including parents’ organizations and child advocates, educators, unions, religious organizations, and service providers (Weiner 1996; Wetzstein 1996; Vobejda 1996). Endorsements came from a wide range of organizations, including some less immediately concerned with children’s issues, such as the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the American Association of Retired Persons, and the AFL-CIO (Superville 1996). The informal coalition united behind the Stand for Children March
therefore included children’s advocates as well as organizations representing a range of interests and policy domains.

Such coalitions allowed child advocates to extend their lobbying efforts by leveraging the electoral resources of their partners. Mainstream educational and health organizations represented thousands of teachers, school administrators, and health professionals; groups such as the AARP and the AFL-CIO also boasted extensive membership bases. Electoral resources were critical for advocates, who faced the difficult tasks of lobbying on behalf of groups with low levels of political participation and lobbying newly-elected Republican legislators unresponsive to their concerns. Child advocates therefore did not simply aim to ally with other child poverty advocates, but rather sought out partnerships with a wide range of organizations engaged in numerous areas of child health, education, and wellbeing (Weaver 2000). By collaborating with groups across policy sectors, child advocates were able to use the resources of partners to engage in activities that demonstrated electoral support for their cause – activities that otherwise would have remained out of reach given their own resource limitations.

*Diverse Partisan Contacts*

In addition to diversity with respect to interest or policy sector, coalitions also united groups that differed with respect to their partisan affiliations and contacts. This type of coalition allowed advocates to target a wider set of legislators by capitalizing on the differential contacts of coalition partners. While such “strange bedfellows” coalitions were rare, one such coalition emerged on a subset of programs known as child exclusion policies. Child exclusion policies denied welfare benefits to a child if the mother was under the age of 18, gave birth while receiving welfare for a different child, or failed to establish paternity for the child. The Child
Exclusion Task Force (CETF) was an ad-hoc coalition that formed in 1994 to prevent the adoption of child exclusion policies. The coalition was headed by the National Organization of Women (NOW) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and by the final round of welfare reform policymaking included over 100 members.

Figure 3, which shows a statement and list of coalition partners submitted by the CETF during House subcommittee hearings (US House 1995, 1625-1626), illustrates both the activities and composition of the CETF. While the CETF united groups from different policy sectors, it also united groups with different partisan attachments. For example, the CETF joined groups aligned with Democratic interests, such as NOW and the ACLU, with groups that allied with Republican interests on the issue of abortion, including Feminists for Life. The CETF was active in lobbying legislators directly and indirectly, submitting testimony during House and Senate hearings on welfare reform, sponsoring media events, issuing press releases, and coauthoring editorials with prominent anti-abortion organizations including the National Right to Life Council (Daly and Lewis 1994; US House 1995, 1625-1626; "Pro-Life and Pro-Choice Groups Schedule Joint Press Briefing Wednesday on Child Exclusion Policies;" Weaver 2000).
CHILD EXCLUSION TASK FORCE

December, 1994

Dear Member of Congress,

As national, state and local organizations with a diversity of views on many issues, we are united in our efforts to promote the health and welfare of America's children. We came together this past year in opposition to welfare reform proposals that would allow states to deny benefits to innocent babies simply because they were born into families receiving AFDC. As the 104th Congress debates welfare reform, more positive child exclusion proposals have appeared which could endanger the health and welfare of America's children. The following provisions would severely harm the children of already impoverished families:

- **WE OPPOSE PROVISIONS THAT WOULD DENY BENEFITS TO CHILDREN SIMPLY FOR BEING BORN INTO FAMILIES RECEIVING WELFARE.**

- **WE OPPOSE PROPOSALS THAT WOULD DENY BENEFITS FOR CHILDREN WHOSE PATERNITY HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY ESTABLISHED BY THE STATE.**

- **WE OPPOSE ANY PROVISION THAT WOULD DENY BENEFITS TO THE CHILDREN OF UNMARRIED TEENAGERS.**

Our principal concern with excluding children from subsistence welfare benefits is that, if enacted, each of these provisions will hurt the children of already impoverished families. Years of social science scholarship makes it clear that people make childbearing decisions for complex and varied reasons. The promise of a tiny incremental gain in welfare benefits is not an inducement to have additional children. Family values will not be advanced by making it more difficult for poor mothers to provide for their children and escape from poverty. Any short-term fiscal savings gained by excluding children from receiving subsistence benefits will be outweighed by the long-term social costs of their impoverishment and the further deterioration of families already in distress.

We urge you to oppose these anti-child, anti-family provisions.

Please contact Martha Davis of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund at (212) 925-9635; Deborah Lewis, ACLU at (202) 695-3312 if you have questions or need more information.
The CETF allowed advocates to expand their lobbying activity by employing the partisan contacts of its pro-life members. In particular, the CETF relied heavily on the access and influence of Catholic Charities, Feminists for Life, and informally, the U.S. Conference of Bishops. The access of such groups to Republican legislators was crucial given the fact that advocates’ access to key decisionmakers in Congress had been curtailed after the Republicans assumed majority control of the House and Senate in 1994 (Rosenfeld 1995; Weaver 2000). In February 1995, for instance, Catholic Charities held a meeting on child exclusion policies for pro-life legislators in which the Catholic Bishops, not formally a member of the CETF, issued a statement opposing child exclusion policies.\textsuperscript{viii} Partners’ access to Republican legislators was leveraged in phone campaigns and office visits, in which pro-life organizations were given responsibility for contacting pro-life members of Congress.\textsuperscript{ix} Representatives for Catholic Charities and Feminists for Life also held meetings with Republican Senators such as Lauch Faircloth, John Ashcroft, Chuck Grassley, and Rick Santorum to assess the Senators’ policy preferences and report on the likely actions of the Senators.\textsuperscript{x}

The lobbying activities of such groups allowed the CETF to communicate with, gather information from, and maintain pressure on legislators with whom advocates had few connections. In other words, the differential access of coalition partners allowed the set of organizations to reach legislators responsive to different interests and constituents. By collaborating with pro-life organizations, advocates were able to use the connections of their pro-life partners to reach legislators who otherwise would have been difficult to access.
Discussion and Conclusion

The welfare reform case illustrates how partnerships across diverse actors allowed advocates for low-income populations to extend their reach in the policymaking process. During welfare reform, advocates for low-income families found themselves in the unenviable position of lobbying to prevent a Republican majority in Congress from enacting dramatic changes to the American social safety net. The difficulty of this task was exacerbated by advocates’ resource limitations. Groups representing the interests of the poor – including social welfare service providers, intergovernmental groups, research organizations, and citizen groups mobilized around poverty-related issues – lacked extensive electoral bases to use in lobbying legislators historically unresponsive to their concerns and few possessed the large budgets of corporate and professional interests.

Despite such challenges, advocates actively lobbied in support of social welfare programs by testifying at Congressional hearings, holding press conferences, contacting members of Congress, and staging large-scale protests. Consistent with theoretical expectations, collaboration across diverse partners represented a prominent strategy of political influence. Coalitions did not simply unite groups that were similar, but rather drew together groups that differed with respect to the resources they possessed. Such coalitions provided resources that allowed advocates to expand their lobbying efforts and engage in activities that would have otherwise been difficult. For example, alliances with mainstream education groups allow advocates to display large demonstrations of public support while partnerships with pro-life organizations gave advocates access to Republican legislators. Thus at least on some issues, coalitions provided advocates with access to resources that they themselves lacked.
Collaboration during welfare reform reveals two types of diversity that were salient to advocates’ lobbying efforts: diversity with respect to interest or policy domain and partisan contacts. Diversity with respect to interest and policy domain allowed advocates to communicate broad support for their policy preferences and leverage the electoral resources of coalition partners, while diversity with respect to partisan contacts allowed advocates to access different types of legislators. This refines the theory presented above by suggesting that two types of diversity may be relevant in assessing the impact of collaborative activity. In addition, because diversity with respect to interest or policy domain expands access to electoral resources, while diversity with respect to partisan contacts expands access to legislators, it is reasonable to expect these types of diversity to emerge as important on other issues.

The analysis affirms both the centrality of coalitional lobbying within this social policy case and the benefits of focusing analytic attention on coalitions rather than individual groups. It is clear that coalitions were integral to interest group lobbying during welfare reform. Advocates did not simply lobby as autonomous actors, but rather sought to exert influence as part of a team. In addition, it is only by elevating the coalition as the object of study that the role of resource diversity becomes apparent. Focusing attention on coalitions reveals that many partnerships during welfare reform united groups with different types of resources and that these resources were deployed strategically to expand the scope of advocates’ lobbying efforts. The analysis therefore provides support for the general expectations of the theory, and suggests that greater investigation into the collaborative lobbying strategies of advocates has the potential to help scholars better understand lobbying and influence in the social welfare policy domain.

Collaborative activity during welfare reform is also instructive in revealing the many different forms that interest group coalitions take. In this case, coalitions varied tremendously in
their degree of formality, with informal collaboration just as pervasive as formal partnerships. Yet both formal partnerships, such as the CETF, and informal partnerships, such as the Stand for Children March, allowed groups to pool diverse resources and extend advocate’s reach in the policymaking process. The fact that so many coalitions were informal in nature attests to the importance of looking beyond readily available lists of interest groups and seeking out sources that permit scholars to observe the indicators of informal collaborative activity. While it is relatively straightforward to observe formal coalitions through lists of registered lobbyists, campaign contributions, or hearings participants, observing informal coalitions is more challenging as they may crystalize only for a short period of time around a discrete issue or decision. Such coalitions are observable through cosigned statements, cosponsored press conferences, and jointly sponsored protests, to name a few examples.

Beyond the social policy domain, the ubiquity of collaborative lobbying across policy domains suggests that focusing analytic attention on coalitional lobbying has the potential to yield insights in multiple issue areas. There are strong reasons to expect the theory itself to extend across policy domains, as the mechanisms underlying a coalition’s influence are not exclusive to groups that lobby on behalf of the poor. By allowing groups to pool diverse resources, coalitions can provide all types of groups with multiple tools for reaching legislators accountable to different types of interests. For instance, coalitions can unite the large budgets of corporate actors with the membership-bases of citizen groups, or the differential partisan contacts of conservative and liberal-leaning professional interests. While much can be gained from analyses that focus on the resources and lobbying activities of individual groups, such approaches cannot yield insights as to how the combined resources and collective activities of a set of organizations generate policy influence. The fact that all types of groups encounter
incentives to collaborate with diverse partners suggests that studying coalitions and their characteristics may prove a fruitful path of inquiry for scholar interested in interest group influence in Congress.
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Notes

i Interest groups also collaborate to signal political strength (Mahoney 2007; Nelson and Yackee 2012). While recognizing the signaling function of coalitions, this article focuses exclusively on coalitions as a tool for pooling resources.

ii Members of Congress, representatives from the Clinton administration, and private individuals with no obvious organizational affiliation (N=59) also testified but are excluded from this analysis. Please see Supplemental Information for coding information.

iii Percentages in column 2 are drawn from Schlozman and colleagues (2012) and show the distribution of organizations listed in the 2001 Washington Representatives directory, while percentages in column 3 are drawn from Baumgarnter and colleagues (2009) and show the distribution of groups cited as “major participants” across 98 issues in Washington. Categories in columns 2 and 3 do not sum to 100% because categories are excluded if there is no comparable category in column 1.

iv Please see Supplemental Information for coding information and full list of coalitions.

v Letter from Fred Kammer, President of Catholic Charities, to members of the House of Representatives, 22 March 1995, Box 4, folder “Catholic Church,” Welfare Reform Series. Bruce Reed Collection. William J. Clinton Presidential Library (hereafter: Bruce Reed Collection)


ix Child Exclusion Task Force Lobby Corps Meeting Minutes, 6 June 1995; and Notes on Senate Welfare Staff, undated; MC 727, Box 33, folder #10, Legal Momentum Records.

x Child Exclusion Task Force: July 13, 1995 Meeting Minutes, undated, MC 727, Box 33, folder #10, Legal Momentum Records.